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The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) gained an unexpected foothold at the heart of 
the British political system following the 2017 UK general election. Political arithmetic 
compelled the then Prime Minister Theresa May to enter a Confidence and Supply 
Agreement with Northern Ireland’s ten DUP MPs in order to shore up her minority 
government. The timing of the DUP’s positioning at the UK’s constitutional centre 
coincided with the early phase of the Brexit process and afforded the small Northern 
Ireland political party a degree of influence as the UK struggled to agree the terms of 
its departure from the EU. This article provides some analytical clarity as to how and 
why the DUP unexpectedly came to play a leading role in Brexit’s complex and 
dramatic political theatre. Drawing on interviews with senior DUP figures, opposing 
political parties, civil servants and political commentators, this article demonstrates 
the hollowness of the DUP’s Brexit position, and points to ways in which the party’s 
influence over the UK’s approach to the Brexit negotiations undermined relationships 
in Northern Ireland between unionists and nationalists, between North and South (on 
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the island of Ireland), and between Ireland and the UK. The research reveals that 
Brexit has precipitated (a return to) a disruptive Unionist politics which is defined by a 
profound and destabilising ontological insecurity and a fear of being ‘sold out’. 
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Signed on 26th June 2017, the Agreement between the Conservative and Unionist 
Party and the Democratic Unionist Party on Support for the Government in Parliament 
(Cabinet Office 2017) was a matter of unanticipated necessity for then Prime Minister 
Theresa May; the consequence of a Parliamentary arithmetic that had been entirely 
unpredicted when she had called the General Election two months earlier. The deal 
represented a surprising and unprecedented opportunity for the DUP to exercise 
power, including the power of veto, in the constitutional centre (see Tonge 2017; 
Tonge and Evans 2017). This was nowhere better demonstrated than in December 
2017 when, at the behest of DUP party leader Arlene Foster, May was forced to delay 
and hastily renegotiate the provisional terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. An 
initial draft of the EU-UK Joint Report on the progress of phase one of the Brexit 
negotiations had proposed a differentiated settlement for Northern Ireland and 
‘regulatory divergence’ across the Irish Sea which the DUP claimed Unionists could 
not countenance (Boffey, Rankin and Asthana 2017; Connelly 2018a).  
 
All subsequent attempts on the part of May’s government to reach and ratify an 
agreement on the terms of exit from the EU were opposed by the DUP. Most hotly 
disputed was what came to be termed the ‘backstop’ (see Connelly 2018b). The 
backstop would see the whole of the UK remain in a temporary single customs territory 
with the EU, while Northern Ireland would remain aligned to those rules of the EU’s 
single market required to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland. This 
arrangement would remain in place ‘unless and until’ both the EU and UK agree that 




A series of clarifications from the EU and commitments from the UK government (see 
DExEU 2019) failed to quell DUP concerns about the impact of the backstop on the 
constitutional and economic integrity of the United Kingdom. The party’s hard-line and 
consistent opposition to all formulations of the backstop contributed to a period of 
immense political instability and volatility in UK politics, which, at the time of writing 
(mid-September 2019), has endured beyond the end of Theresa May’s tenure as 
Prime Minister, and looks set to continue regardless as to the final outcome of the 
Brexit process.  
 
This article provides some analytical clarity as to how and why the DUP unexpectedly 
came to play a leading role in Brexit’s complex and dramatic political theatre. We 
address three inter-related questions. First, to what extent is the DUP’s support for 
Brexit reflective of the party’s ideological principles and consistent with the wider 
political programme it has developed since the 1970s? Second, what impact has Brexit 
had on (re)shaping the party’s principles, programme and conduct (and vice-versa)? 
Third, and perhaps most crucially, what are the likely enduring consequences of the 
DUP’s support for Brexit on the relationships across the three ‘strands’ which define 
and shape Northern Irish politics, namely: those within Northern Ireland (that is, 
‘community relations' between Unionists and Nationalists); North-South (between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic) and East-West (between Ireland and the UK)?  
 
In what follows, we map the political evolution of the DUP in general, and of its long-
term policy approach to ‘Europe’ in particular. Drawing on interviews with senior DUP 
figures, as well as with members of opposing parties, Northern Irish and Irish civil 
servants and political commentators, we demonstrate that the party’s support for Brexit 
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during and since the 2016 referendum is as much the result of strategic 
(mis)calculation and of the contingency of events as of long-term party policy or 
political principle. And we suggest that it reflects and has contributed to a regressive 
deviation from the long-term trend towards accommodation and compromise which 
had lately defined the DUP’s political journey. We demonstrate the ways in which: the 
issue of Brexit has become politicized within Northern Ireland; how it has been mapped 
on to and intensified the pre-existing conflicts which define Northern Irish politics; and, 
how this has been both influenced by, and has served to influence the course of 
political events since the 2016 referendum. Above all, our research reveals that Brexit 
has precipitated (a return to) a disruptive Unionist politics which remains defined by a 
profound and destabilising ontological insecurity and a fear of being ‘sold out’. 
 
The DUP and the character of Ulster Unionism 
Unionism is “a layered and complex” (Farrington 2001, 49) sociological assemblage, 
and one which is “cross-cut by tensions involving politics, culture, class, region, 
popular culture and religious denomination” (McAuley 1999, 115). The 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist (PUL) community in Northern Ireland is defined by 
segmentation and internal conflict: the secular versus the religious; the rural versus 
the urban; the dogmatic versus the pragmatic; the elite versus the grassroots. 
Unionism is also highly gendered (Ashe and McCluskey 2015), and class stratification 
has been a persistent and divisive fault-line in its intra-communal politics (McGovern 
and Shirlow 1997; McAuley 2010, 2016; Mulvenna 2015). In effect, Ulster Unionism is 




Though Unionists may differ across myriad socio-political vectors, traditionally, they 
have shared a unifying political aspiration – that is, the defence of the Union between 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland not only from the seditious threat posed by Irish 
Nationalism, but from the neglect, apathy and even hostility of its own Westminster 
government (see Todd 2018, 142). The DUP’s electoral stall has traditionally been 
built precisely on the perception that Northern Ireland is a “rather less than cherished 
region of the British state” (Coulter 1996, 172), and on what Farrington (2001, 69) has 
defined as this “Unionist sense of siege and anxiety over [the] political future” in the 
face not only of Republican hostility, but also of ‘mainland’ British ambivalence. 
 
The DUP was formed in 1971 by the Reverend Dr Ian Paisley following his election to 
the Northern Ireland Parliament. The influence of the fundamentalist and evangelical 
Free Presbyterian Church – of which Paisley was the founder and long-serving 
moderator – on the party has been significant. On a range of social and moral issues, 
the party was (and remains) deeply conservative. This includes staunch opposition to 
abortion and same-sex marriage. The strength of the link between the DUP and the 
Free Presbyterian Church has diminished post-Paisley. However, religiosity remains 
high within DUP party ranks and among the party leadership, and social conservatism 
continues to be a hallmark of the party’s outlook (Tonge et al 2014, 160).  
 
Paisley’s brand of evangelical Protestantism was based on vigorous opposition to the 
Roman Catholic Church and linked to a steadfast defence of the Union against the 
forces of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), rival Unionist politicians, the 
Irish and British governments. The party was virulently resistant to political attempts 
to address the conflict, and particularly to the institutionalisation of any role for the Irish 
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government – no matter how marginal – in the governance of Northern Ireland. In 
1985, Unionist objections to the Anglo-Irish Agreement – which granted a consultative 
role in Northern Irish affairs to the Irish government and was considered by all shades 
of Unionism to be a Westminster sell-out – were stoked by Paisley’s fiery and 
impassioned rhetoric. 1985, however, proved to be something of a turning point in 
Unionist culture and politics (see Cochrane 1997), and many macro-political 
developments since, including, significantly, the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, 
have been interpreted by some Unionists as representing an ever deepening of the 
“psychological abandonment” (McAuley 1999, 114) of Northern Ireland and as steps, 
therefore, towards a United Ireland. 
 
Where the (then electorally predominant) Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) moderated its 
position during the 1990s, in the context of the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires, and 
signed up to the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the DUP walked out of the talks 
before they concluded. The party was unable to countenance supporting the 
Agreement in the absence of full IRA decommissioning, and the party also harboured 
reservations about the devolution of policing and justice powers. The DUP’s hostility 
to both the letter and spirit of the Agreement connected with an increasingly sceptical 
and apprehensive Unionist electorate after 1998.  
 
Unionist voters grew disenchanted with the post-1998 political dispensation, which 
many of them viewed, inter alia, as disproportionately favouring Nationalists in areas 
such as recruitment to the police and civil service; unjustly rewarding Republican 
‘terrorists’ with early release from prison and posts in government; and more broadly 
undermining of Northern Ireland’s ‘Britishness’ (Dixon 2008; McAuley 2010). UUP 
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electoral fortunes diminished, and those losses were converted into DUP gains. By 
2003, the DUP had eclipsed their UUP rival to become the largest catch-all Unionist 
political party in Northern Ireland. Electoral advances, however, brought new political 
responsibilities. As power beckoned, it was clear that a new, more accommodating 
relationship between principle and pragmatism was needed if the DUP was to 
complete its transition from a party of protest to one of government. Compromise was 
reached at St Andrews in 2006. The St Andrews Agreement addressed some of the 
DUP’s key reservations about the 1998 settlement and significantly, it recorded Sinn 
Féin’s expression of support for the reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI). This provided the basis for what had previously been represented by the DUP 
as entirely unconscionable, and saw the party’s leadership agree to share power with 
their sworn Irish Republican adversaries.  
 
There were certainly still doubts on the part of the DUP about elements of the peace 
settlement: the party’s support for the North-South dimensions of the 1998 Agreement 
remained flimsy, and relations with Sinn Féin have continued to be testy. Issues such 
as parading, the Irish language, same-sex marriage, abortion and the legacy of the 
Troubles have continued to provide flash-points in the so-called culture war which has 
shaped the post-conflict political culture of Ulster Unionism (see Parr 2017; Evershed 
2018a). Unionist anxiety about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future has been stirred 
intermittently and deliberately by the DUP post-St Andrews (See, for example., Nolan 
et al 2014). However, when Ian Paisley assumed the position of First Minister in May 
2007, it nonetheless marked a significant watershed in the DUP’s move “from hardline 
bystander to major governing force” (Tonge et al 2014, 4) and saw this fear go 
(somewhat) into abeyance. By the time of the 2012 DUP party conference, then party 
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leader, Peter Robinson, was able to pronounce that, “the siege has lifted…and the 
constitutional debate has been won” (Robinson 2012). As Ganiel (2009) intimates, the 
seemingly profound transformations in party rhetoric, policy and praxis over the course 
of the peace process (and the tensions between dogmatism and pragmatism that 
accompanied them) were pre-figured by the evolution of the DUP’s policy approach to 
the European Union.  
 
‘Hard-baked’ Euroscepticism? 
The most definitive study of the DUP to date, The Democratic Unionist Party: From 
Protest to Power, was published in 2014 by Tonge et al. In light of events since, it is 
notable how little attention they paid – in what is otherwise a comprehensive study of 
DUP members’ positions on a multitude of policy areas – to the question of ‘Europe’. 
Arguably, this is testament to how distant a prospect ‘Brexit’ (and how relatively 
unimportant, therefore, such a question) seemed between 2012 and 2013, when the 
research for this study was carried out. Indeed, as Ganiel (2009, 576) argues, 
traditionally, “European issues have hardly mattered” at all in Northern Ireland 
electoral politics, including during elections to the European Parliament, which have 
served “at best [as] an additional medium for local party competition” (Ibid., 568; See 
also Murphy 2009). By and large, European Parliament elections have, according to 
Bruce (2007), been treated by Northern Irish voters as proxy referenda on Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional status. As Ganiel (2009, 584) suggests, this helps to explain 
the traditional focus in the DUP’s European election campaigning on the importance, 




Of course, party-founder Ian Paisley’s staunch opposition to the EU on millenarian 
religious (and anti-Catholic sectarian) grounds was notorious (Bruce 2007; Moloney 
2008; Ganiel 2009, 577-579). In 2016, senior DUP figures, including MP and deputy 
party leader, Nigel Dodds, and former chief of staff, Chris Montgomery, were 
prominent among the “palaeosceptics” (Shipman 2016, 6) who established and 
directed Vote Leave. DUP Policy Officer, Lee Reynolds, was seconded to Vote Leave 
as the campaign’s regional co-ordinator for Northern Ireland. While this all lends 
validity to claims on the part of senior members and representatives that the DUP has 
been a consistently “anti-Europe and Eurosceptic party” (DUP Councillor, interview 
with author, 2018), ‘Europe’ has arguably never been a significant (let alone core) 
issue for the party or its supporters. Rather, it has traditionally been consigned to the 
margin of an ethno-national policy agenda concerned above all with protecting the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland. As Ganiel (2009, 586) suggests, in general, 
the party’s Euroscepticism arguably has therefore had less to do with its views on the 
EU per se than with attempting “to appeal to voters as a means of distinguishing 
itself…to the extent that the strength of one’s anti-European position reflects the 
strength of one’s Britishness”. 
 
Moreover, the DUP had often exhibited, if not evidence of what Ladrech (2002; see 
also De Winter and Gomez-Reino 2002) has termed ‘Europeanization’, then at least a 
degree of elasticity in its approach to the EU. Between the late 1970s and the late 
1990s, European Parliament elections consistently provided the party and its leader 
with a platform, a seat and a funding stream, even while they remained more marginal 
forces in domestic Northern Ireland politics. Ganiel (2009, 577) highlights what she 
describes as “pragmatic engagement” by subsequent DUP MEPs from Paisley 
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onwards with the European Parliament on priority issues, including agriculture, fishing 
and funding for infrastructural projects. While maintaining its Eurosceptic rhetoric, in 
practice the party has demonstrated a willingness to work within European frameworks 
in pursuit of the benefits afforded to Northern Ireland – particularly under the auspices 
of the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (PEACE), the 
European Regional Development Fund’s INTERREG programme and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) – by the UK’s membership of the EU in general, and the 
province’s status as a peripheral and disadvantaged region in particular (Ibid.) 
 
While the DUP’s 2014 European election manifesto called for a referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the EU, it did not explicitly advocate for a Leave vote. And 
crucially, under the heading, ‘Securing our place within the Single Market’, it made a 
series of claims which are worth quoting here at length: 
 
“The DUP recognises that the Single Market is one of the European Union's 
most transformative assets. We want to maximise the economic opportunities 
that it presents for Northern Ireland. 
 
As a region of the UK, Northern Ireland is now part of a Europe that is better 
connected than ever before, by air, rail, sea and online. With better connectivity 
there is an inherent potential for economic growth, via the free movement of 
labour, goods, capital and services. [The DUP] wants to help businesses and 
individuals in our local communities to exploit this potential. 
 
We are committed to promoting Northern Ireland's highly-educated and high-
skilled workforce at an EU level and showcasing our region of the UK as an 
hospitable business environment within the Single Market.” (DUP 2014, 22)  
 
Given the prevailing, generally unspoken and largely uncontested assumption of the 
UK’s (and, by extension, Northern Ireland’s) ongoing membership of the EU there is 
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an argument that by 2014 the DUP’s rhetoric on Europe was beginning to catch up 
with the reality of its long-term, pragmatic and exigent engagement with European 
institutions. However, in 2016, this same assumption also gave the DUP the political 
space it needed to roll back from its increased conjoining of policy and practice in order 
to declare for Leave.  
 
Gobsmacked 
To a person, no DUP member (nor for that matter, any member of an opposing party 
nor any political commentator) whom we have interviewed seriously viewed the Leave 
campaign(s) as likely to emerge victorious from the EU referendum. As suggested by 
one senior former DUP staffer:  
 
I wouldn’t say that the referendum was just ‘going through the motions’, but 
there weren’t that many people I spoke to who ultimately thought that Leave 
was going to win … there was a freedom for some people to support the Leave 
campaign because they could support what they had always believed in, vote 
for it, believing that the outcome was nonetheless going to be Remain. 
(Interview, 2018) 
 
In this context, the DUP’s coming out for Leave can be seen as much a matter of party 
management, political expediency and electoral opportunism as of ideological 
principle.  
 
Following David Cameron’s announcement in February 2016 that the referendum 
would be held that June, senior party members swiftly and unanimously backed a 




I was at the policy-making conference that we had – I say conference, it was a 
meeting upstairs [at Stormont] – where they said, ‘right gentlemen, we need to 
agree our policy on Brexit’ – this was before the referendum. And ten minutes 
later we had agreed our policy. We just went ‘round the room and it was, ‘Burn 
it! Shoot it! Strangle it!’ (DUP MLA, interview, 2018). 
 
One DUP official also noted that this reflected the mainstream view among the party’s 
wider electoral base: “[T]he pool of potential voters that the DUP would be swimming 
in in a Northern Ireland context; there would also have been a strong pro-Leave 
majority there” (Interview with author, 2018). 
 
For Arlene Foster – then new to the job of party leader – adopting a pro-Leave position 
allowed her to placate and tap into these Eurosceptic urges while seemingly posing 
little by way of real risk to the ‘modernising’ project of the DUP’s more economistic, 
generally younger and more (neo)liberal wing (See Tonge et al 2014). The perceived 
wisdom, even among those most vociferous in their support for Leave, held that the 
party would emerge from the referendum campaign as ‘noble losers’ (DUP Councillor, 
interview with author, 2018). Theologically, this gelled well with the party’s Paisleyite 
heritage, its tradition of millenarian apocalypticism, and with its identifying itself as the 
bearer of a redemptive testimony that all but the elect are liable to ignore, including 
about the EU’s perceived satanic and corrupting influence (see Searle 2015). This 
expectation also tapped into the dominant tropes of victimhood, defeatism, insecurity 
and the ‘siege mentality’ which, as noted above, are definitive of Unionist political 
culture (see also Finlay 2001; Cohen 2007; McVeigh 2015; Evershed 2018a). Tying 
together these related and defining themes in Unionist political culture is a common 
thread: virtue is synonymous with fighting a perennial battle against what are 
perceived as perverse moral currents, debased opponents and overwhelming odds. 
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Crucially, this battle is against not only the hostile Republican and Nationalist other, 
but also the progressive trends perceived as being promoted by the British 
establishment. These include economic globalisation, multiculturalism, 
‘permissiveness’, secularism and (pro-European) internationalism.   
 
In adopting a Leave position, the DUP were able to embody and benefit from this 
particular and idiosyncratic form of anti-establishment sentiment: enhancing their 
political capital through positioning themselves against the UK (and, indeed, Irish) 
government(s); Nationalists in both the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – 
historically the most Europhile of Northern Ireland’s political parties – and Sinn Féin – 
who in 2015 had adopted a critically pro-Remain position amid concern about the 
potential impact of Brexit on all-Ireland affairs and institutions, the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement and PEACE funding; the cross-community Alliance Party; and their 
immediate rivals in the UUP – whose leadership eventually advocated for Remain 
(Murphy 2018, 33-37). In sum, and as indicated during an interview with one SDLP 
MLA:  
 
If you wanted to talk about sovereignty, wave your Union Jacks and wind up 
Nationalists, Brexit’s your man…[And] for a lot of [DUP members], everything 
is war by another name: because Nationalists were for Europe, then Europe 
must be bad...I also think that lots of leaflets with Union Jacks on them, and 
arguments around sovereignty –  I think for a lot of them, they thought it would 
be a bit of a sandpit: that it was never going to go through, and they could do 
whatever they wanted. They could beat their chests and have flags on leaflets 
‘til the cows came home, stand up beside ‘British’ values and there would be 
no consequences (Interview, 2018)  
 
This view was echoed during our interview with a one-time DUP staffer when they 
said, “probably the fact that Irish Nationalism in latter years has been so pro-EU, 
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there’s probably some hint in the middle of all that, that if they’re for it, we’re against 
it” (Interview, 2019). 
 
In addition to the (ethno-)political and electoral dividends1 derived by the DUP from 
their participation in the symbolic displays of Britishness and the essentialised 
arguments about sovereignty which defined the EU referendum (Murphy 2018, 26-27; 
Gordon 2016), taking a Leave position in 2016 also proved financially lucrative for the 
party. On 21st June, two days before voters went to the polls, the party sponsored a 
four-page wrap-around advert in the freesheet Metro newspaper in cities across the 
UK, urging readers to ‘Vote to Leave on Thursday’. Somewhat ironically – given the 
party’s subsequent insistence on full post-Brexit regulatory alignment with Great 
Britain – the DUP were under no legal obligation to declare the source of the funding 
for this advert under Northern Ireland’s differentiated laws on political party donations. 
However, in the wake of a report by investigative journalists Peter Geoghegan and 
Adam Ramsay (2017) at openDemocracy, they were eventually pressured into 
revealing that they had received £425,622 during the referendum from the clandestine 
‘Constitutional Research Council’, of which £250,000 was used to pay for the Metro 
advert (Ibid.). Its receipt of such a large sum demonstrates that there were material as 
well as electoral rewards in the party’s backing Leave. However, the Metro does not 
circulate in Northern Ireland, and the only voters in the UK represented by and eligible 
to vote for the DUP were therefore not exposed to it. This is reflective of a certain 
ambiguity in the DUP’s messaging around Brexit.  
 
In general, the DUP’s campaigning during the Brexit referendum in Northern Ireland 
itself was more muted (Murphy 2018: 48). Arlene Foster’s formal announcement that 
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the party would be backing Leave was far from unequivocal, acknowledging that “DUP 
members and voters will hold a range of differing personal views as to what is in the 
best interests of the United Kingdom” (News Letter 2016). Indeed, the party’s pro-
Leave position put it at odds with sections of the business and farming communities 
which traditionally (and particularly in the case of the latter) form part of its own 
constituency and support-base (See Keating et al 2009, 61-62; Murphy 2018, 45-48). 
To coin a notorious Northern Irish idiom, ‘the dogs in the street know’ that senior party 
figures did not themselves vote for Brexit precisely because of the risk it posed to 
Northern Ireland’s long-term economic prosperity and political stability (see, for 
example, Bell 2016).   
  
Numerous seasoned political commentators have attested to the expectation among 
senior party figures that Remain would win the referendum, and the level of surprise 
within the party hierarchy about the result (see, for example, Emerson 2018; Gorman 
2018; Kane 2019). This was mirrored in several of our interviews with party members. 
For example, one senior member of the DUP noted:  
 
we were all gobsmacked, I think, when we woke up the next morning. I don’t 
think any of our people confidently thought we were going to win it…Obviously, 
we hadn’t developed policy on the basis of Brexit [but] now we’ve had plenty of 
time to develop policy. And that policy is now out, on the strongest possible 
terms! (DUP MLA, 2018).  
 
Ultimately, it seems clear that the DUP backed Leave anticipating a Remain result. 
Testament to Shapiro and Bedi’s (2007, 9) assertion that “political actors, no less than 
political scientists, can be victims of contingencies that they do not understand”, the 
DUP’s position on Brexit is not the product of long-term policy-making, but a reflection 
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of the indeterminacy, uncertainty and conditionality of events. And it has been 
impacted upon and compounded by the outcomes of the unanticipated Northern 
Ireland Assembly and UK General elections in 2017, which conspired to see an 
unprepared and embattled DUP taking increasing responsibility for delivering on the 
result of the 2016 referendum at the national level, under the terms of its confidence 
and supply pact with the Conservatives. Arlene Foster’s torpedoing of the first draft of 
the EU-UK Joint Report in late 2017 represented the extent of the DUP’s (new-found) 
power and influence, but also, arguably, its high-water mark (see O’Toole 2017a, 
2017b; Gorman 2018; Bevington and Wager 2018; Emerson 2019). Further, the 
influence her party appears to have enjoyed since June 2017 has arguably served to 
mask or elide a series of dynamics which have been more destabilising and troubling 
for the DUP, its support-base and the wider Unionist community in Northern Ireland, 
including as reflected in the (equally snap) Assembly election in 2017. Not least among 
these has been the loss of Unionism’s electoral majority in Northern Ireland.  
 
Crocodiles, Crisis and Kingmaking 
On 26th August 2016, then Northern Ireland First and Deputy First Ministers Arlene 
Foster and Martin McGuinness issued a joint letter to Prime Minister Theresa May, 
highlighting “a number of issues which are of particular significance” for Northern 
Ireland in the context of the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU. These 
issues included the border, the all-island energy market, EU peace funding and the 
need to maintain tariff- and barrier-free trade with the EU, particularly for agri-foods 
(Executive Office 2016). On the surface, this letter appeared to signal a pragmatic and 
collaborative cross-party approach to Brexit on the part of the DUP. However, insofar 
as it was ever reflective of the DUP’s policy on Brexit, any conformity between their 
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approach and that of their Nationalist coalition partners proved to be short-lived. Within 
a few months of the First and Deputy First Ministers’ joint letter, and in the wake of the 
‘Cash for Ash’ scandal, Martin McGuinness had resigned, collapsing the Northern 
Ireland Executive and triggering what would be a particularly rancorous Assembly 
election.  
 
Suffering from terminally ill-health, McGuinness was replaced as Sinn Féin’s Northern 
leader by Michelle O’Neill, who led the party into the Assembly election on 2 March 
2017. The perceived arrogance of the DUP party, its prejudice towards members of 
the LGBT community and ethnic minorities, and its intolerance of Irish language, 
identity and culture of which McGuinness had accused Arlene Foster and the DUP in 
his resignation letter (Belfast Telegraph 2017) became prominent themes in the 
election campaign. The image of the DUP in the eyes of many voters was not improved 
by several gaffes on the part of the party’s leader, including during a press conference 
in which she referred to proponents of an Irish Language Act as ‘crocodiles’ who, if 
fed, would “keep coming back for more” (Gordon, 2017).  
 
The net result was something of a surge in support for Sinn Féin, whose first 
preference vote share rose by 3.9 percent compared to their result in the 2016 
Assembly election, while the DUP’s fell by 1.1 percent (BBC News 2017a). In an 
Assembly reduced from 108 to 90 seats2, this translated into a net loss of 10 seats for 
the DUP, including those held by party grandees, Nelson McCausland and Lord 
Morrow. With 28 seats, the DUP fell below the 30-seat threshold required to 
unilaterally trigger a ‘petition of concern’3 – which it had traditionally used to veto 
legislation on marriage equality – while Sinn Féin’s tally of 27 seats brought it within 
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one seat of becoming the largest party in the Assembly. Crucially, Unionism had lost 
its majority in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and for the first time since the state was 
founded in 1921, Unionist candidates failed to gain a majority of votes cast and seats 
available in an election in Northern Ireland.  
 
This apparent sea-change in Northern Ireland electoral politics came as a bitter blow 
to the DUP from which they were still reeling when Theresa May made the surprise 
announcement on 18th April 2017 of a snap General election, to be held in June. The 
DUP contested this election on a manifesto which insisted that they were uniquely 
positioned to “stand up for unionism, speak up for Northern Ireland, and stop Gerry 
Adams and Sinn Féin from dictating the political agenda” (DUP 2017, 23). This 
message found a receptive audience in a Unionist constituency still coming to terms 
with the loss of an electoral majority it is highly unlikely ever to enjoy again. Unionism 
failed to regain its electoral majority, but the DUP experienced a surge in support, 
adding some 10.3 percent of vote share to its result in the previous General election 
in 2015 (as compared to a 4.9 percent swing to Sinn Féin) and two extra seats in the 
House of Commons (Sinn Féin gained three), taking its total number to 10 (with Sinn 
Féin on seven) (BBC News 2017b).  
 
With Theresa May’s Conservatives falling short of a majority by eight seats, this left 
the previously crisis-ridden DUP in a position of wholly unexpected relative strength 
and Arlene Foster, according to one political commentator, “breathing a sigh of relief” 
(interview, 2018). Thus the stage was set for Brexit’s peculiar form of political theatre, 
in which the DUP has, as much to the surprise of its leadership and wider membership 
as anybody else’s, come to play a leading role. The victory of the Leave campaign(s) 
20 
 
in the 2016 referendum: the crisis confronting the DUP before, during and after the 
2017 Assembly election; the party’s new-found position as kingmaker following the 
snap General election; and its ongoing opposition to the Withdrawal Agreement, in 
general, and the backstop, in particular, quite unexpectedly propelled the DUP from 
the periphery to the very centre of British politics. The party’s positon on the backstop  
permeated broader Westminster narratives and debates on the withdrawal process 
and became totemic for Tory Brexiteers, who used it to justify their own opposition to 
the Withdrawal Agreement (Sheldon 2019). This eventually contributed to May’s 
downfall and replacement as Prime Minister by the more ‘hardline’ Boris Johnson, who 
had garnered DUP support by promising to scrap the backstop4. And it has had 
profound consequences for political relationships within and between the islands of 
Great Britain and Ireland.  
 
The Impact on Relationships 
The many unexpected and overlapping political crises and electoral contingencies 
which have unfolded since the UK voted to leave the EU in 2016 have served to re-
open old wounds in Northern Ireland. The issue of EU membership – which was largely 
benign before 2016 – has been deeply and enduringly politicised (see Murphy 2018); 
intensifying the Nationalist-Unionist divide and becoming conflated with the wider and 
bitterly contested question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. During the 
initial phase of the Brexit negotiations, the primary political casualties of this trend were 
North-South relations, British-Irish relations and relationships within Northern Ireland. 
The three central strands of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement were negatively 
affected by a deep sense of insecurity within the DUP about how Brexit was being 
managed and (supposedly) manipulated, to the detriment of Unionist interests and 
21 
 
aspirations, by nationalists in Northern Ireland, by the Irish and British governments, 
and by the EU.  
 
The DUP’s pro-Brexit stance was viewed by Nationalists as a deep, existential and 
even deliberate threat to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, its institutionalisation of 
Nationalist identity and cultural expression, and its fostering of North-South co-
operation on the island of Ireland. Attempts to articulate these fears appeared to fall 
on deaf ears within the DUP, and party leader Arlene Foster fuelled Nationalist 
concerns about her party’s commitment to the Agreement (which, of course, it did not 
support in 1998) by suggesting that she did not regard it as ‘sacrosanct’ (Campbell 
2018). Concurrently, the DUP summarily dismissed Nationalists’ proposals for a 
differentiated post-Brexit settlement for Northern Ireland (see Sinn Féin 2016; SDLP 
2017) and came to represent support for the backstop as an intrinsically (and 
insidiously) Nationalist position. This was despite the fact that such support extended 
far beyond Sinn Féin, the SDLP and their supporters. The Alliance and Green Parties 
were also consistent and vocal in their support for the Withdrawal Agreement, as were 
key civic and business organisations and trade unions. Indeed, opinion polling 
consistently suggested that the backstop has the support of a majority in Northern 
Ireland (see, e.g., Murphy 2019 and Lucidtalk 2019).  
 
Notwithstanding the contradictions and inaccuracies in the DUP’s arguments about 
the implications of the Withdrawal Agreement for the constitutional integrity of the 
Union (see Evershed 2018b, 2019; Skoutaris 2018; Hayward and Phinnemore 2019), 
Brexit can nonetheless be seen to have added something of a constitutional dimension 
to the mix of forces undermining and straining political relationships in Northern 
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Ireland. Other contested issues included the status of the Irish language, legacy 
matters and same-sex marriage (see O’Leary 2018). Where Unionists perceived that 
the long-term cohesion of the United Kingdom had become less secure following the 
Brexit vote, this was deemed to be a consequence of nefarious agitation by ‘pan-
Nationalist’ forces. A feeling of being besieged was reawakened and Unionists’ anxiety 
about their political future intensified. This revived sense of constitutional insecurity 
resulted in the DUP adopting some of the more disruptive characteristics of its 
traditional modus operandi, which included a deep mistrust of all shades and 
manifestations of Irish Nationalism.  
 
While relations between the DUP and the Republic of Ireland were never warm, before 
Brexit they had reached a point where they were cordial. Contact between the party 
and officials and politicians in Dublin had become regular, functional and even 
mundane. Some of this engagement was filtered through the Strand Two institutions 
of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and some was more informal and based on 
personal contacts. Many of these links were focused on areas of mutual interest and 
frequently involved an EU dimension. For example – and as intimated in an interview 
with a former Northern Irish official with several years of experience in the area of 
North-South co-operation – the agri-food sector was increasingly viewed by the DUP 
as a legitimate site for co-operation on an all-island basis. Despite the development 
within the party of an apparently more convivial approach in the years since the St 
Andrews Agreement, cross-border co-operation was an aspect of the peace process 
which tended to sit uneasily with the DUP (Tonge et al 2014, 77, 224). Brexit 
intrinsically jeopardises North-South relations (see Phinnemore and Hayward 2017) 
and among nationalists there was a perception that the DUP’s support for Brexit and 
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rejection of the backstop represented a more-or-less deliberate attempt by the party 
to unpick a vital component of the peace process in line with its own preferences (see, 
for example, McDaid 2018). The DUP’s apparent blindness to the threat posed by 
Brexit to North-South relations was among the factors contributing to a rapid souring, 
not only of the relationship between the DUP and Nationalists in the North, but also 
between the party and the Irish government.  
 
For its part, the DUP expressed frustration that the Irish government favoured Remain 
during the 2016 referendum, and party members objected to Irish government 
pronouncements on the subject. Interventions by Irish Ministers and, on occasion, the 
then Taoiseach Enda Kenny, were viewed as interference in a definitively sovereign 
British matter (see Moriarty 2016). The party, however, reserved its fiercest criticisms 
for Kenny’s replacement as Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar. Arlene Foster accused the Irish 
premier of being ‘reckless’ when it comes to Brexit and Northern Ireland (BBC News 
2017c). Deputy Leader, Nigel Dodds argued that the Irish government had been 
deliberately awkward and obstructive, and that “when Leo Varadkar became 
Taoiseach, he stopped work on practical solutions [to address the border issue]” (Daily 
Politics 2017). Particularly in light of Varadkar’s promise to Nationalists in Northern 
Ireland that they will “never again be left behind by an Irish government”, the Irish 
government’s position was interpreted cynically by DUP-ers who viewed and 
represented it as being a cover for longer-term Nationalist constitutional ambitions 
(see Murphy 2019b). For example, DUP MP Jeffery Donaldson stated: 
 
It is increasingly apparent that the Irish government does not seem to care 
about securing a sensible and pragmatic outcome from Brexit which can work 
for both Northern Ireland and the Republic. Their preferred approach is to use 
24 
 
Brexit in whatever way possible to undermine Northern Ireland and particularly 
its constitutional position. (Belfast Telegraph 2018) 
 
In a more spirited contribution, DUP MP Sammy Wilson even accused Irish Tánaiste 
Simon Coveney of “trying to do with Brexit, what the IRA tried to do with bombs, that 
is break up the United Kingdom and it is not going to work” (RTÉ News 2018). These 
sentiments were stridently repeated by all those within the DUP that we interviewed. 
There was a sense of anger and frustration about the way in which the Irish 
government (particularly under Taoiseach Leo Varadkar) had (or was perceived to 
have) distanced itself from Northern Ireland Unionists, and this reignited suspicions 
about the Irish state’s ambitions to achieve a united Ireland.  
 
The DUP consistently and vehemently downplayed evidence of the economic impact 
of Brexit on both Northern Ireland and the Republic, and rejected Irish fears about 
Brexit’s impact on the peace process. The Irish government’s staunch insistence on 
the need for the backstop fuelled the sense of betrayal felt by Unionists vis-à-vis the 
Irish government’s intentions. Where the Irish government claimed to be protecting 
and defending the Irish national interest, the DUP saw perfidy and treachery. The blow 
to Unionists’ delicate sense of security was intense. As one senior DUP figure noted: 
“Dublin wants to fulfil its objective of securing a united Ireland [and] they believe the 
more you can separate Northern Ireland from the UK, the better the chance of 
achieving a united Ireland" (DUP MP, interview, 2018).  
 
Animosity between the DUP and the Irish government over the backstop bled into the 
wider British-Irish relationship. This relationship was already strained by the 
confidence and supply arrangement between the party and the British government, 
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which had undermined the extent to which the latter was perceived as an impartial 
partner and guarantor of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (see Lyons 2017). In 
theory, in this context, the DUP’s poor relationship with Dublin (and with Irish 
Nationalism more generally) ought to have found its equal and opposite in its close 
relationship with the British government. On the face of it, the DUP-Conservative 
confidence and supply arrangement represented a significant win for its junior partner. 
However, this relationship was not without its difficulties. As discussed above, the first 
version of the December 2017 Joint Report – negotiated by the UK government and 
European Commission – was greeted with dismay by the DUP and eventually replaced 
with a document which was more palatable to Unionist sensibilities. The episode 
exposed a serious level of miscommunication and misunderstanding between the 
parties to the confidence and supply deal (cf. Connelly 2018a).  
 
Theresa May’s failure to keep the DUP in the loop on an issue of such political 
sensitivity, her inability to foresee the party’s reaction to the original draft text of the 
Joint Report, and her failure to win its support for the Withdrawal Agreement, suggests 
two things. Firstly, the British government appeared unclear about the depth of 
Unionist opposition to particular Brexit formulae which could potentially lead to 
regulatory divergence across the UK. Secondly, the pressures which May faced from 
within her own party were so profound that DUP interests were vulnerable to 
displacement should a possible Brexit deal have garnered broad appeal among 
Conservatives. As the (much) smaller party to the confidence and supply deal, the 
DUP could not be steadfastly sure of the Conservative Party’s ongoing and unrelenting 
support for a hard-line Northern Ireland Unionist position on Brexit. This was all-the-
more so given the increasing fragmentation of the Conservative Party and its intense 
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intra-party struggles over the meaning of Brexit. Not even the appointment of the 
(supposedly) anti-backstop Brexiteer Boris Johnson as Prime Minister in July 2019 
assuaged the DUP’s sense of nervousness.   
 
In the past, and as noted above, British governments were not always seen to be 
reliable guarantors or protectors of Unionist interests. The DUP is therefore sensitised 
to the potential longer-term weakness of their position. According to one interviewee: 
“We are clear that what we have here is a temporary arrangement. It will [only] last for 
a time” (DUP MP, interview with authors, 2018). There was also an insistence that the 
DUP’s position on Brexit does not align fully with the Conservative Party’s position: 
“We haven’t given the Conservatives carte blanche on Brexit. We have very clear 
views on it and we will hold to them” (Ibid.). The DUP emphasised its desire to protect 
the interests of Northern Ireland, based on the party’s interpretation of the effects of 
Brexit. However, as one senior Irish official noted, there are often differences between 
private conversations with (and within) the DUP and the party’s public 
pronouncements:  
 
Private conversations … are about genuine concerns about life after Brexit and 
about building a relationship and working North-South and working across the 
islands, and that if that doesn’t work then that would be against the interests of 
Unionism. (Interview, 2018) 
 
There remains some identifiable tension within the DUP between dogmatists and 
pragmatists and between those who are less and more Eurosceptic. However, the 
DUP leadership invariably prevented any form of overt moderation (publicly at least) 
for fear of undermining its credentials as the most pro-Union party at a time of 
constitutional challenge (cf. Hayward 2017). The extent to which the DUP was able to 
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amend or soften their narrative or position on Brexit was effectively limited by a 
perception that Nationalists were intent on leveraging the backstop to achieve Irish 
unity. In this context, any short-term economic fallout was a necessary sacrifice to 
protect the constitutional integrity of the Union as the DUP perceive and define it.  
 
Unionist insecurity and suspicion in the context of Brexit was not just confined to the 
British and Irish governments. It also extended to the EU. DUP leader Arlene Foster 
accused the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, Michel Barnier, of aggression over the issue 
of the Irish border, and of not seeking to understand Unionism (O’Carroll 2018). 
Misunderstanding of the Unionist position in Europe was acutely felt by the party and 
fuelled further concerns about the constitutional fate of Northern Ireland. According to 
one DUP figure:  
 
They [the EU] want to hive off Northern Ireland … It is very clear that what they 
are trying to do is bind Northern Ireland into the EU, the idea being that that 
moves Northern Ireland towards some sort of unitary approach on the island. 
(Interview, 2018) 
 
The DUP’s perception of an EU agenda vis-à-vis Irish unity, and the party’s inability to 
arouse what might be viewed as Unionist sympathy or empathy in Brussels hardened 
party attitudes towards the EU, and raised questions within the party about the 
impartiality and bona fides of key Brexit negotiators.  
 
Brexit and the DUP’s Political Regression 
Cochrane suggests that Unionist insecurity and an isolationist political culture has 
played a role in “constantly preclud[ing] progressive political behaviour” (Cochrane 
1997, 83). In other words, suspicions about the intentions and motives of others vis-
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à-vis Northern Ireland prompted unionists to be overtly defensive, obstructive, and 
antagonistic in their defence of Northern Ireland and the Union. Greer (2015, 40) notes 
that: “The belief that their place in the United Kingdom is precarious has ensured that 
reasonable co-operation has not been the standard unionist approach to domestic 
politics and constitutional talks”. Brexit is an issue of both “domestic politics and 
constitutional talks”. In effect, it touches at the very heart of Unionist sensibilities, 
sensitivities and insecurities; and as a consequence, ‘reasonable cooperation’ 
between the DUP and other actors was a casualty. During the first phase of the Brexit 
negotiations, the party was able to disengage from a wider cross-party discussion on 
Brexit for two reasons: firstly, it (temporarily and tenuously) had the ear of the British 
government through the confidence and supply deal; and secondly, the collapse of the 
Northern Ireland devolved institutions isolated the party from any need or ability to 
work towards consensus with political opponents in Northern Ireland on Brexit. These 
quirks of the political and electoral environment lent the DUP greater leverage than it 
might ever normally have been able to exercise. However, such developments were 
not sufficient to fully allay Unionist insecurity because Brexit influenced other forces to 
which Unionism had to be attentive.  
 
A key explanation for Unionist insecurity is population change. The trend towards a 
Catholic majority in Northern Ireland intensified as the initial phase of Brexit 
negotiations proceeded (with some suggestions of a Catholic majority by 2021). 
Population change alone does not, of course, automatically threaten the Union. Brexit, 
however, did test the strength of Catholic/Nationalist support for the constitutional 
status quo. A report by Garry et al (2018) found that in the event of a hard Brexit, 53 
per cent of Catholics would vote for a united Ireland. This contrasts with 28 per cent 
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support should the UK opt to remain in the EU. In effect, Brexit altered the prism 
through which Northern Ireland’s constitutional status could be viewed and released a 
series of dynamics which added to Unionist feelings of insecurity. These were 
antagonised by increasing ‘civic’ Nationalist mobilisation around the question of Irish 
unity5. 
 
Many of those interviewed for this article were of the view that pressures were building 
for a border poll. Although a border poll (prompted by Brexit) was emphatically not 
British or Irish government policy, any talk of Irish unity invariably provoked suspicion 
and insecurity among Unionists. By equating Brexit with a possible united Ireland, the 
DUP was forced into a corner. Moderation on Brexit then became akin to selling-out 
on the constitutional question for the DUP. However, a lack of moderation drew out 
old Unionist insecurities, strained improved relationships and rolled back political 
progress. This was reminiscent of the Unionism of old – besieged, insecure, defensive 
and distrustful.   
 
The (constitutional) instability and uncertainty which Brexit aroused in Northern Ireland 
provoked political discourse and behaviour which was characteristic of the DUP at its 
most disruptive. Brexit reproduced conduct which had been challenged, and to some 
extent moderated, in the period between 2007 and the EU referendum vote. The UK 
vote to leave the EU, however: fuelled the DUP’s mistrust of Nationalism, the Irish 
government and the EU; permitted some detachment from the formal and informal 
cross-border mechanisms created by the 1998 Agreement; reinforced suspicions 
about the extent to which the British government is a reliable guarantor of Unionist 
interests; and, engendered hostility towards the EU. The DUP was acutely nervous 
30 
 
about the possibility of being sold-out. The resurgence of these old Unionist political-
cultural traits represented a troubling regression. Brexit stirred up some of the negative 
features of the traditional Unionist character, which had been somewhat assuaged 
during the peace process. However, by unsettling the solidity of the constitutional 
settlement, Brexit precipitated Unionism’s revisiting of old feelings of insecurity and 
besiegement. The resulting robust opposition to the backstop relied on discourse and 
behaviours which had been (largely) consigned to the past, but which found new 
relevance and expression in the era of Brexit.   
 
Conclusion  
From the DUP’s perspective, phase one of the Brexit process simultaneously 
represented a moment of unprecedented (and unanticipated) political opportunity and 
of existential threat. A breaking of the EU bond shared by both the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland permitted some disentanglement from the elements of the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement with which Unionism had been least comfortable, namely those 
which link Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. At the same time, there were 
other dynamics which threatened to undermine key tenets and the integrity of the 
Union. Talk of a hard Brexit invigorated (some) Nationalist calls for a border poll and 
a united Ireland. The absence of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland further 
fuelled the rift between the DUP and its detractors. Not alone did it limit relations 
between Northern Ireland political parties, but it also removed North-South contact and 
cooperation. Although it was not the primary cause of the collapse of the power-
sharing institutions, the early period of the Brexit process undoubtedly played a role in 




The electoral and political arithmetic produced by recent elections and Brexit-related 
developments altered the political environment in Northern Ireland. The DUP’s tactics 
and strategies played a critical role in shaping the wider political agenda. The party’s 
words, actions and behaviours proved decisive in terms of shaping how Brexit 
impacted on relationships within Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland, and between the two islands; and their impact is liable to endure 
regardless of the eventual outcome of Brexit. There are ominous signs that the stability 
and permanency of these relations may be undermined for as long as the UK’s 
constitutional future remains unclear. The true depth and extent of Conservative Party 
support for the Unionist position was questionable during the initial phase of the Brexit 
process, and the deeply felt perception that the Union may once again be under threat 
permitted the DUP to rekindle its traditional character as the true defender of the 
Unionist cause. This entailed the revival of old insecurities including a siege mentality; 
overt defensiveness; and deep mistrust of others. The re-emergence of those traits 
synonymous with the DUP’s at its most disruptive interrupted a period of relative 
stability in Northern Ireland when power-sharing and the institutions of the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement were operable, and a benign accommodation of both 
traditions was in evidence. This shift equated to a regressive deviation in the trajectory 
of the DUP’s political journey. The destabilising consequences of Brexit into the future 
may further threaten an already chronically insecure Unionist politics, and in the 
process undermine Northern Ireland’s delicate and tenuous political equilibrium.  
1 In the referendum of 2016, Leave received 44.2 percent of vote share in Northern Ireland (BBC News 
2016b), whereas in the 2015 General and 2016 Assembly elections the DUP had received 25.7 and 
29.2 percent respectively (BBC News 2015; BBC News 2016a) The increase to 36.0 percent of Northern 
Ireland vote share for the DUP in the 2017 General election (BBC News 2017a) was attributed by a 
series of senior party figures to being, at least in part, a consequence of the party’s identification with 
and advocacy for Brexit (interviews with author, 2018).  
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2 As per the terms of the 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Assembly Members (Reduction of 
Numbers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 reduced the number of seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
from six per constituency to five. With the number of constituencies standing at 18, this represented a 
reduction from 108 to 90 seats.  
3 Intended to guarantee effective power sharing at Stormont, the ‘petition of concern’ is designed to 
prevent the predominance of one ‘community’ over the other. A petition of concern can be brought to 
the Speaker in advance of any vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly. To be accepted, it requires the 
signatures of 30 Members (MLAs). If a petition is successfully lodged against a particular motion, then 
its passage requires the assent of a weighted majority (60 percent of those present and voting), and of 
at least 40 percent of each of the Unionist and Nationalist designations present and voting.  
4 Though at the time of writing, there is some speculation that Johnson may be prepared to revisit a 
reformulated backstop in order to secure a Brexit deal (see Evershed 2019b). 
5 For example, Brexit has precipitated the establishment of #Think32, a grass-roots, (avowedly) cross-
community and non-party political movement, whose professed aim is to promote and encourage 
debate on Irish unity. An event held by the group at Belfast Waterfront Hall in January 2019 attracted 
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